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By Peter B. Rutledge
The Arbitration Fairness Act is a well-intended but ultimately misguided attempt to address a system of dispute resolution that has largely worked well. The 
bill currently being considered by Congress rests on a series 
of flawed empirical premises. This article addresses three. 
First, though the bill posits that arbitration leaves consumers 
and employees worse off, data demonstrate individuals over-
all are often better off under a system with enforceable pre-
dispute arbitration agreements than a system without them. 
Second, although the bill promises improved access to jus-
tice, the proposal actually erects more impediments. Third, 
though the bill suggests that postdispute arbitration will pro-
vide a continued outlet for this system of dispute resolution, 
it fails to recognize the significant structural impediments to 
a successful system of postdispute arbitration. 
First, it now appears to be common ground that the 
policy debate over the Arbitration Fairness Act should 
focus on empirical data. We all can harness our success 
stories and horror stories about arbitration (or any other 
system of dispute resolution). Yet the Arbitration Fairness 
Act does not simply address the bad cases while preserv-
ing the good. Instead, it proposes a systemic overhaul that 
categorically bans predispute agreements entirely. Thus, 
to assess the bill’s impact, a systematic view of the empiri-
cal data is appropriate.
Interestingly, the data frequently show that predispute 
arbitration in general produces better outcomes for indi-
viduals. In March, the Searle Institute of Northwestern 
University Law School published a thorough study 
of consumer arbitrations conducted by the American 
Arbitration Association. Contrary to the cries of arbitra-
tion’s critics, individuals fared quite well, prevailing in a 
significant number of arbitrations and recovering a rea-
sonable share of the damages that they sought. This study 
represents simply the latest chapter in a growing body 
of empirical literature suggesting that arbitration large-
ly reaches a fair result for individuals in their disputes 
against companies.1
To be sure, not all studies are as sanguine. Some 
research suggests that low-income individuals in arbitra-
tions under promulgated (as opposed to individually nego-
tiated) arbitration agreements fare poorly.2 Such results, 
though, simply beg the question about what causes such 
outcomes. Is it that arbitration is stacked against the indi-
vidual? Or something in the nature of the claim that gives 
rise to a low likelihood of success, whether in arbitration, 
litigation, or some other forum?
Not only are the data mixed, but they are also incom-
plete. Although the Arbitration Fairness Act broadly 
addresses employment, consumer, and franchise arbitra-
tion, gaps exist in all three areas, especially franchise 
arbitration, in which few studies are available and almost 
none address outcomes.
The upshot here is simply that Congress should tread 
cautiously when contemplating a systematic overhaul of a 
system that, by some measures, produces favorable results 
and, in other important respects, has an incomplete 
empirical record.
Second, eliminating predispute arbitration agreements 
impedes rather than improves an individual’s access to 
justice. For one thing, individuals may find it more difficult 
to find a lawyer if they are forced to litigate their claims. 
The high costs of our civil litigation system mean that 
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lawyers generally will demand high recoveries and a high 
prospect of success before they are willing to undertake a 
case. By contrast, the lower costs of arbitration and the 
procedural flexibility enable an individual to obtain judg-
ment at a lower cost.
Apart from access to counsel, arbitration improves 
access to justice in another respect. Individuals achieve 
results faster. Every major empirical study on arbitration 
has found that it produces results faster than litigation. 
For individuals who seek recovery, the speed to resolution 
may be a valuable advantage of this system of alternative 
dispute resolution. By eliminating predispute arbitration, 
Congress may worsen access to justice and end up hurting 
the very classes of people whom it purports to protect. 
For society as a whole, the costs of resolving disputes 
without arbitration would rise. Consider the thousands of 
disputes currently resolved by arbitration. If those disputes 
no longer were arbitrable, where would they go? “To the 
courts” is the obvious answer. But any self-respecting law-
yer or judge would tell us that the court dockets are already 
overburdened. Shuttling these cases out of arbitration sim-
ply lengthens the line at the courthouse for everyone.
Some defenders of the Arbitration Fairness Act try 
to turn these arguments on their head by arguing that 
arbitration deprives plaintiffs of the ability to bring class 
actions and thereby deprives those plaintiffs “access 
to justice.” There is some surface appeal to this argu-
ment, but it ultimately does not support adoption of the 
Arbitration Fairness Act. For one thing, the argument 
assumes the widespread adoption of class action waivers, 
and although some evidence suggests its use in certain 
industries (such as the cellular telephone industry), I am 
unaware of any systemwide evidence on this point. For 
another thing, even assuming the problem is widespread, 
the argument further assumes that a large number of cases 
exist that would satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23’s exacting standards—again, I am unaware of any 
empirical evidence on this point. Finally, even assuming 
that these two preceding hurdles can be overcome, the 
argument does not support the wholesale invalidation of 
arbitration clauses—a more calibrated solution would sim-
ply invalidate class action waivers but not the arbitration 
clauses themselves. Organizations such as the American 
Arbitration Association have begun to develop extensive 
experience administering class arbitrations, and there is 
no principled reason why the purported benefits of a class 
action cannot also be realized through the mechanism of 
an arbitration. Thus, at bottom, the class action argument 
is a bit of a ruse—at best it is an argument for the invali-
dation of class action waivers; at worst, it is self-interested 
politicking by class action plaintiffs’ lawyers masquerading 
as policy making in the public interest.
Third, defenders of the Arbitration Fairness Act often 
argue that postdispute arbitration mitigates these and other 
risks of eliminating enforceable agreements. Yet postdispute 
arbitration is not a viable alternative to predispute arbitra-
tion agreements. One problem is psychological—parties 
are simply far more willing to agree on matters before a dis-
pute has arisen; once a dispute arises, the opportunities for 
cooperation dwindle. The second problem is structural: the 
parties’ incentives in the postdispute context fundamen-
tally differ from the predispute context. Postdispute parties 
have more information, which enables them to make more 
calculated decisions regarding which form of dispute resolu-
tion better promotes their interests or effectively hinders 
the individual’s interests. Conversely, in the predispute 
context, parties have an incentive to enter into arbitration. 
An individual’s incentive is that arbitration is an afford-
able forum with superior chances for a favorable result. A 
company’s incentive is that arbitration can lower the com-
pany’s litigation costs. 
At bottom, the Arbitration Fairness Act applies a meat 
cleaver to an issue that requires a scalpel. The solution is not 
for Congress to prohibit predispute arbitration agreements 
in employment, consumer, and franchise contracts. Instead, 
Congress should encourage and await additional empirical 
research. Research may show minor additions to the regula-
tory repertoire are necessary. However, wholesale, retroac-
tive elimination of predispute arbitration agreements would 
effectively make worse off the individuals whom Congress, 
through this legislation, seeks to protect. u
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to agree to a process that was truly better and more effi-
cient for all.
In the end, the most practical way to ensure that 
arbitration is fair is to make it voluntary on a postdispute 
basis. Once a dispute has arisen, consumers, employees, 
and other “little guys” will be able to make knowledge-
able determinations as to whether the proposed arbitra-
tion is efficient and fair for all concerned. The proposed 
Arbitration Fairness Act in this sense would use the free 
market to ensure that arbitration is fair and just. u
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